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Chinese computational propaganda: automation, algorithms and the 
manipulation of information about Chinese politics on Twitter and 
Weibo 
A 2016 review of literature about automation, algorithms and politics identified 
China as the foremost area in which further research was needed because of the 
size of its population, the potential for Chinese algorithmic manipulation in the 
politics of other countries, and the frequency of exportation of Chinese software 
and hardware. This paper contributes to the small body of knowledge on the first 
point (domestic automation and opinion manipulation) and presents the first piece 
of research into the second (international automation and opinion manipulation).  
Findings are based on an analysis of 1.5 million comments on official political 
information posts on Weibo and 1.1 million posts using hashtags associated with 
China and Chinese politics on Twitter. In line with previous research, little 
evidence of automation was found on Weibo. In contrast, a large amount of 
automaton was found on Twitter. However, contrary to expectations and previous 
news reports, no evidence was found of pro-Chinese state automaton on Twitter. 
Automation on Twitter was associated with anti-Chinese state perspectives and 
published in simplified Mandarin, presumably aimed at diasporic Chinese and 
mainland users who Ôjump the wallÕ to access blocked platforms. These users 
come to Twitter seeking more diverse information and an online public sphere but 
instead they find an information environment in which a small number of anti-
Chinese state voices are attempting to use automation to dominate discourse. Our 
understanding of public conversation on Twitter in Mandarin is extremely limited 
and, thus, this paper advances the understanding of political communication on 
social media.  
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Introduction: The rise of computational propaganda and social media bots  
Twenty-sixteen has come to be seen as a time of political turmoil and the year in which 
long-standing fears about the negative effects of social media on democratic politics were 
finally realised. In a referendum marred by false promises based on misleading 
information (Helm, 2016), growing nationalism that led to the murder of an MP (Cobain 
& Taylor, 2016) and the algorithmic manipulation of online public opinion (Howard & 
Kollanyi, 2016), the UK narrowly voted to leave the EU.  
Several months later, polemical billionaire Donald Trump won the US presidency. 
During campaigning, automated accounts, particularly in pro-Trump hashtags, dominated 
discourse on Twitter (Howard, Kollanyi, & Woolley, 2016) and junk news was shared as 
frequently as professionally-produced news (Howard, Bolsover, Kollanyi, Bradshaw, & 
Neudert, 2017). Accusations of Russian technological interference in the election are 
now the subject of several major congressional investigations (LoBianco, 2017). 
Although the true influence of automated (bot) accounts on social media is 
unknown, emerging evidence suggests that they are effective at spreading information 
and deceiving users. In the run-up to the US Presidential election, human Twitter users 
retweeted bots at the same rate as other humans (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). It has also been 
shown that typical Internet users cannot determine whether information has been 
produced by a human or a bot (Everett, Nurse, & Erola, 2016).  
Although bots were identified in US political events as early as 2010 (Mustafaraj 
& Metaxas, 2010; Ratkiewicz et al., 2011), the need to understand bots and their effects 
is now more urgent. Technical and policy solutions to the apparent problem of bots have 
been advancing ahead of academic research and there are several notable areas in which 
knowledge is lacking. Chief among these is understanding computational propaganda in 
relation to China, which was identified as the primary area in need of further 
investigation in a review of literature concerning automation, algorithms and politics 
(Shorey & Howard, 2016). 
Media reports of Chinese computational propaganda  
As yet, no academic research has investigated whether the Chinese state uses bots as part 
of its international propaganda strategy. However, there have been sporadic media 
reports of Chinese state-associated bot activity and some academic reviews of media 
reports concerning social media manipulation. 
A 2016 review of 48 English-language newspaper reports concluded that in 
authoritarian countries bots tend to be used to demobilise opposition voices and spread 
pro-government messages, while in countries with a longer history of democracy they are 
generally only used for social media follower padding (Woolley, 2016). A similar review 
of 83 English-language media reports concluded that authoritarian states tend to focus on 
their domestic populations, while democratic countries frequently use social media 
manipulation to target foreign publics (Bradshaw & Howard, 2017). 
However, this conclusion (based on a limited number of English-language media 
reports) that authoritarian countries do not use automation to target foreign populations 
contrasts with the current concern about Russian computational propaganda. A US 
Intelligence report concluded that Vladimir Putin targeting the 2016 US Presidential 
Election with a multifaceted influence campaign that blended Òcovert intelligence 
operationsÑsuch as cyber activityÑwith overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, 
state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ÔtrollsÕÓ 
(Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017, p. 2). 
Little scholarly attention has been paid to whether China undertakes similar 
media manipulation strategies. However, media reports have suggested that the Chinese 
state may be attempting to influence public opinion on Twitter. In early 2014, it was 
reported that more than 100 fake Twitter accounts were spreading positive propaganda in 
English about conditions in Tibet; these accounts were followed by many human users, 
who apparently believed these accounts belonged to real people (Kaiman, 2014). 
Later that year, there was an alleged bot attack on the actor Murong Xuecun, who 
had been critical of the Chinese state; more than 800 recently created Twitter accounts 
circulated a 10-page article attacking the actor (Henochowicz, 2014; Phillips, 2014). A 
similar incident was reported in October 2017, when numerous apparently automated 
accounts posted messages attacking the Chinese businessman and anti-corruption 
campaigner Guo Wengui (Collins & Cox, 2017). 
These media reports suggest that China may be using automation to spread 
propaganda but no academic work has investigated this issue. However, the body of 
academic work on ChinaÕs foreign media strategy more broadly may be relevant to 
understanding whether the state might use bots and automation to spread propaganda.  
Chinese soft power, public diplomacy and foreign propaganda 
In the early 2000s, China intensified its focus on its foreign image and started to cultivate 
consent for the countryÕs peaceful rise, using official state media to engage with civil 
society in foreign countries (Y. Wang, 2008). The 2006 Five-Year Plan argued ChinaÕs 
soft power should be based on Òstrong propaganda methods and strong propaganda 
capabilitiesÓ (Hayden, 2012, p. 137).  
However, this propaganda has focused on traditional media, paying little attention 
to online media (Creemers, 2015). Between 2009-2010, the Chinese government 
reportedly spent $8.7 billion on foreign propaganda, with the majority going to China 
Central Television, China Radio International, the Xinhua News Agency and the China 
Daily newspaper (Shambaugh, 2010). 
While these big four providers are common names, there is also evidence of 
covert strategies. A 2015 Reuters investigation uncovered 33 radio stations in 14 
countries broadcasting pro-Chinese state propaganda and structured so as to obscure that 
the majority shareholder was China Radio International (Qing & Shiffman, 2015).  
 The majority of the academic work on Chinese foreign propaganda points to a 
focus on traditional media. However, conditions change rapidly in China. Xi Jinping, 
who took over the helm of the party in late 2012, has taken a hard-line attitude towards 
domestic media liberalisation and this appears mirrored in foreign propaganda efforts.  
Between the time Xi took office and December 2015, the Freedom House noted 
more than 40 instances in 17 countries and international institutions of Chinese 
information controls negatively affecting free expression outside China (Cook, 2015). 
There have also been reports of interference in Chinese language media in countries such 
as Canada and Australia (Kalathil, 2017). 
 XiÕs crackdown on Chinese online information combined with the rising 
prominence of the Internet suggests that the online might have become a greater part of 
ChinaÕs external media strategy.  In the lead-up to ChinaÕs 2016-2020 Five Year Plan, 
the concept of Internet Power was prominent in guideline documents (Livingstone, 2016). 
It also seems that Chinese production of online propaganda, such as Internet memes, 
clickbait headlines and promotional videos, has increased (Livingstone, 2016; Chow, 
2017). These media are instances of computational propaganda and suggest the Chinese 
government is paying more attention to foreign social media; however, there has been no 
academic research to investigate whether the bots and automation that were so prominent 
in recent political events in the US are being employed to disseminate Chinese foreign 
propaganda.     
Domestic propaganda and opinion manipulation in China 
China has a long history of information control and a very different approach to 
propaganda. Since the communist revolution, the media have been run on a Marxist 
model that puts the needs of the state above truth, impartiality or diversity (Li, 2013; 
Xinhua, 2016). After the rise of the Internet, these ideas were first extended to social 
media companies, then online opinion leaders and finally all Internet users (Bolsover, 
2017).  
Many of the techniques used to control content on the Chinese Internet are 
automated (Ng, 2015; Zhu, Phipps, Pridgen, Crandall, & Wallach, 2013). However, little 
evidence exists for the bots that have been prominent in other countries. For years, 
commentators spoke about the Ô50-Cent Party,Õ individuals paid 50 cents per post to 
attack critics and support the state online (Greitens, 2013; Hassid, 2012).  
However, based on a leak from an Internet Propaganda Office, a research team at 
Harvard came to a surprising conclusion; rather than an army of users paid by the post, 
the 50-Cent Party was composed of government employees who posted pro-state content 
as part of their regular jobs (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017). Investigating whether these 
posts were automated, the team concluded Òthe evidence strongly indicates to the 
contraryÓ (ibid, p. 11). 
Despite a lack of evidence of automation, fake accounts appear to be frequently 
employed to manipulate information on the Chinese microblogging giant Sina Weibo. An 
analysis of networks of news dissemination found that retweeting by fake accounts 
occurred in 6% of news stories and that 30% of the accounts that acted as opinion leaders 
were fake (Bolsover, 2013). 
Although fake accounts are frequently employed to manipulate public opinion, 
there has been no evidence of automation in China. This conclusion is somewhat 
surprising given the sophistication of Chinese Internet control and the prevalence of use 
of bots in other countries. Although the Harvard study found no evidence of automation, 
it was based on a single leak from one local-level Internet propaganda office. Thus, more 
research is necessary to establish whether or not there is bot activity on Chinese domestic 
social media.  
Methods and data collection 
Social media are the most widely used functionality of the contemporary Internet. Of 
social media platforms, microblogs are an ideal venue for the investigation of online 
computational propaganda because of their public nature. Almost all of the previous 
research about bots and automation has focused on Twitter. Thus, this research focuses 
on Twitter and its domestic counterpart in China, Sina Weibo.  
Researching Computational Propaganda on Weibo 
Although sometimes referred to as a Chinese Twitter, Sina Weibo 2 , the largest 
microblogging platform in China, provides different technical and social affordances for 
political speech and public opinion manipulation. A particular affordance of Weibo that 
does not have a parallel on Twitter is its threaded commenting system, which provides a 
space for users to engage in discussions that are more akin to those that occur on 
Facebook (Bolsover, 2016). A quarter of all Ò50-Cent PartyÓ posts made in Weibo 
comments (King et al., 2017). Thus, Weibo comments are a prime venue in which 
automated computational propaganda might occur.  
In order to investigate whether evidence of computational propaganda appears in 
Weibo comments, the posts of 26 major information providersÑnews organizations, 
government departments and official mouthpiecesÑwere collected over the 2017 Spring 
Festival period. These accounts were selected to cover the largest state providers of news 
information on the platform, drawing from the platformÕs leader boards and lists of the 
highest circulation media providers in China. Prior research has suggested that there are 
higher levels of state-led public opinion manipulation during official holidays (King et al., 
2017). 
                                                
2	Weibo literally means microblog and several commercial microblogging platforms exist, 
including those of Sina and Tencent. However, Sina Weibo is the largest microblogging platform 
in China and is often simply referred to as Weibo.  In line with this discourse, further references 
in this paper to Weibo (capitalised) should be understood as referring to the Sina Weibo platform. 
Table 1: The 26 selected information providers and their reach 
Account name English name Number of 
followers
3
  
Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ PeopleÕs Daily 55.7 million 
,搝鄛? Weibo breaking news channel 52.6 million 
,帿? CCTV News 52.3 million 
Ӫ≁㖁 People.cn 39.8 million 
ᯠॾ㖁 Xinhua 31.4 million 
ᯠॾ㿶⛩ Xinhua Viewpoint 30.5 million 
ѝഭᰕᣕ China Daily 30.1 million 
ޜ.륇᠘茍(唁䲔
ഋ.? 
Ministry of Public Security and Public Security Bureau targeting 
counterfeit, fake and stolen goods and gambling and drug-related 
crimes 
29.2 million 
ᯠ⎚ၡҀ Weibo entertainment channel 22.7 million 
ݹ᰾ᰕᣕ Guangming Daily 19.0 million 
ᗞ,处? Weibo 24-hour Information Channel 16.2 million 
ᯠ⎚䍒㓿 Weibo economics channel 14.9 million 
ᯠ⎚、ᢰ Weibo Science and Technology Channel  12.0 million 
ইᯩᰕᣕ Southern Daily 11.2 million 
⧟⨳ᰦᣕ Global Times 9.0 million 
ᯠ⎚㿶仁 Weibo video channel 8.7 million 
ेӜ䶂ᒤᣕ Beijing Youth Daily 8.0 million 
⊏.넇鰑뤍場? Nanjing Public Security Bureau, Jiangning Branch 8.0 million 
ᒯᐎޜ.? Guangzhou Province Public Security Bureau  5.7 million 
,帿? CCTV 5.2 million 
ѝഭ㖁㔌⭥㿶ਠ Chinese Network Television 3.7 million 
ᯠ⮶ਁᐳ Xinjiang Propaganda Department 3.7 million  
ࠔࠠ㖁 Phoenix News  2.8 million 
㓒ᰇ᮷は Red Flag Manuscripts 610,000 
䶂᱕к⎧ Shanghai Youth League 413,000 
᣹㩘ਁᐳ Lhasa, Tibet Propaganda Department 201,000 
 
All of the posts made by these 26 information providers were collected between 26 
January and 7 February 2017 (n=6,145). Comment data for each of these posts was 
collected at least two weeks after they were originally posted. The final dataset contained 
1,543,165 comments by 815,776 unique users. 
Researching Computational Propaganda on Twitter 
Although Twitter is blocked in China, it is still used by some Chinese individuals, 
particularly as a subversive space for those who want to engage in discussion about 
sensitive issues (Sullivan, 2012). Geolocation of a random sample of Twitter accounts 
found that about 0.17% of all monthly-active users were located in mainland China 
                                                
3	As of January 2018.	
(Bolsover, In Press). Furthermore, as described in previous sections, the Chinese state 
actively cultivates a positive image of the country among foreign populations and there 
have been several media reports of bot activity associated with Chinese state interests on 
Twitter.  
Thus, in order to investigate Chinese computational propaganda on Twitter, a 
preliminary list of hashtags associated with China and Chinese politics was drawn up. All 
of the tweets made between 24 January and 5 February 2017 using one of these hashtags 
was collected. These tweets and their concurrent hashtags were analyzed to ascertain 
hashtags commonly used to post about Chinese politics. A final list of 27 of the most 
common hashtags associated with Chinese social, political and cultural issues was 
established (Table 2). All of the tweets posted between 21 February and 8 April 2017 that 
used one of these hashtags was collected. 
Table 2: The hashtags used for data collection on Twitter 
Hashtags Collected Description 
#China, #Hongkong, #Beijing, #Shanghai, #Xinjiang, 
#Tibet, #Taiwan 
Important locations (English) 
ѝഭ俉⑟ेӜк⎧ᯠ⮶㾯㯿
(China, Hong Kong, Beijing, Shanghai, Xinjiang and 
Tibet) 
Important locations (Mandarin) 
 
 
#ChinaCulture, #ChinaTravel, #panda Positive foreign publicity  
#SouthChinaSea, #Diaoyudao, #Senkaku Areas of territorial disagreement  
#dalailama, #buddhism, #Kadampa Buddhism  
#XiJinping, Ґ䘁ᒣ #XiVisit Chinese premier Xi Jinping 
ӪᵳHuman rights)  
#AntiChina  
 
Computational propaganda on Twitter: a dominance of anti-state voices  
The final dataset contained 1,177,758 tweets from 254,132 unique accounts. Quantitative 
analysis using custom Python scripts revealed that information about China and Chinese 
politics on Twitter is dominated by a small number of voices. More than half of the 
tweets were made by users who posted more than 100 times during the data collection 
period and 42% of posts were posted by users who posted more than 300 times. Almost 
30% of the tweets in the dataset came from the top 100 highest-posting users.  
Data returned from the Twitter (as well as the Weibo) API provides the source 
platform of the tweet, such as Twitter for iPhone, the Twitter web client, or third-party 
platforms such as TweetDeck or Hootsuite. These data can provide the best evidence for 
account automation; if 100% of the accountÕs tweets are made using an automation 
platform it is, without a doubt, a bot. Seventy-one of the top-100 highest posting 
accounts posted all or almost all of their posts using known automation platforms: 35 
used the Japanese platform twittbot.net, nine IFTTT (If This Then That) and four dlvr.it. 
Additionally, many of these accounts appeared to be using custom automation scripts. 
This provides a clear indication that there is significant automation within this 
dataset.  However, because automation can be executed through custom scripts or via a 
standard client such as Twitter for Android or iPhone, using only post source to identify 
bots, particularly if this process is automated, will likely produce false negatives. Thus, 
in order to further investigate evidence for automation in the dataset and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of quantitative, scalable methods for identifying bots, two metrics used in 
previous research were applied to the dataset.  
The tool BotOrNot (now Botometer) was developed by researchers at Indiana 
University. A score of 50% or higher on BotOrNot is generally seen as indicating the 
account is Òsuspicious to a scrupulous analysisÓ (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). The average 
BotorNot score of these 100 accounts was 54.7%, indicating a relatively high level of bot 
activity. Twenty-two of the top 100 posting accounts had a BotorNot score of less than 
50; however, these accounts clustered at the upper end of the range with seven accounts 
scoring 48 or 49. However, several of the accounts that scored less than 50 were clearly 
bots, with 100% of their tweets posted using automation platforms.  
Another quantitative, scalable measure that has been used to identify automated 
accounts is posting frequency; a cut-off point of 50 posts per day in monitored hashtags 
was used to identify likely automated accounts in the 2016 US election (Howard et al., 
2016). The top 100 highest posting users in the Twitter dataset posted on average 70 
times per day, with the top 38 highest posting users posting more than 100 times per day. 
However, many accounts posting only through automation platforms or that received 
high BotorNot scores, posted less than 50 times per day across the examined hashtags.  
Each of these three metrics Ð post source, BotOrNot and post frequency Ð 
suggests high levels of automation among the highest posting users, who produced 
almost 30% of the posts in the dataset. The comparison of the three metrics suggest that 
each is conservative. They are unlikely to produce false positives but may produce false 
negatives. Post source is the most reliable method for bot identification but it is not 
scalable over large datasets. 
A further limitation of these methods is that they focus solely on quantitative data. 
This can help identify bots and the hashtags in which they are active but cannot speak to 
the actual content that these bots are associated with, i.e. the propaganda they might posts 
and the interests furthered by this automation.  It is important to remember that not all 
bots promote propaganda. Institutions, companies, news media and individuals all use 
automation to post non-propaganda content. Thus, in order to understand the nature of 
computational propaganda about China on Twitter, it is necessary to qualitatively analyze 
the profiles and posts of these high-posting accounts. 
Previous research has found evidence of likely automation based on numerous 
characteristics: posting frequency (bots tend to post much more frequently than 
individual users), post time (bots can post consistently across the entire day while 
humans need to sleep), post content (bots often post only about a single issue), post 
repetitiveness (bots often repeatedly post the same or similar messages), percentage of 
retweets (many bots only retweet otherÕs content), connectivity (bots are often part of 
groups that interact with each other through mutual following and sometimes retweeting), 
number of friends and followers (many bots build followers through reciprocal 
relationships and thus have a similar number of friends and followers, other bots will 
have almost no friends or followers) and post interaction (many bots will have no user 
interaction on their timelines).  
The profiles of each of the top-100 highest posting users was inspected and 
evaluated according to the above metrics. Based on this examination, each of the 100 
accounts that had not been suspended by the time of analysis (n = 82) was deemed to be 
an automated account 4 . The type of content posted by these accounts was coded 
according to a scheme derived from an examination of the dataset. No accounts posting 
pro-Chinese-state content were found within these 100 users; however, half of these 
accounts posted anti-Chinese-state content. Among these there were two large groups: 
the 1989 group and the pan-Asia group (Table 3). This is a surprising finding given 
previous media reports of Chinese state bot activity on Twitter and, thus, descriptions of 
each of these two groups are provided in the following sections. 
The 1989 bot group 
Accounts in this group promote content about human rights in China, particularly related 
to keeping alive the memory of the 1989 student-led democracy movement that ended 
with the Tiananmen Square ÒincidentÓ. All of the posts of accounts in this group are in 
simplified Chinese and information posted by these accounts dominates hashtags related 
to China and major Chinese cities in both English and simplified Mandarin (#China, 
#Hongkong, #Beijing, #Shanghai, 俉⑟ेӜк⎧). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4	The	fact	that	18	of	the	accounts	had	been	deleted	between	data	collection	and	the	qualitative	
analysis	phase	suggests	that	these	accounts,	which	were	predominantly	automated	using	custom	
scripts,	were	identified	as	bots	and	deleted	by	the	platform.	
Table 3. Top 100 highest-posting accounts  
 
Number of 
accounts in 
top 100 
posters 
Number of 
posts in 
dataset 
Percentage of 
posts in 
dataset 
Average 
BotOrNot 
Score 
Anti-Chinese-state bots     
1989 group 22 117,578 9.98% 60 
Pan-Asia group 22 44,678 3.79% 48 
Independent anti-Chinese-state 
bots 5 7,969 0.68% 
65 
Both anti-Chinese-state and 
commercial content 1 1,090 0.09% 
50 
Other political bots 
   
 
Professional news bots 10 39,239 3.33% 48 
ÒFake newsÓ bots 4 10,213 0.87% 71 
Other non-political bots 
   
 
Commercial bots 8 34,860 2.96% 58 
Job bots 6 8,592 0.73% 55 
Other non-political bots 4 6,620 0.56% 39 
Account suspended 
   
 
Account suspended 18 64,170 5.45%  
TOTAL 100 335,009 28.44%  
 
Accounts in this group often use variations on the same profile name Ā≁ѫӪ
ᵳā (democracy, human rights). These accounts also use similar screen names (cnjs8, 
wib_dl, wib_s, cjss4, wib_z), similar profile pictures (often of generically attractive 
Asian women or photos with the words human rights or democracy), and similar or 
identical header pictures (images associated with human rights in China, such as the 
famous Òtank manÓ in Tiananmen Square). Each of these 22 accounts posted, on average, 
118 tweets per day in one of the monitored hashtags. These accounts all utilized 
twittbot.net, with 100% of their online activity conducted through this automation service. 
Figure 1 shows the top four highest-posting accounts in this group and 
demonstrates their similarity. Three have almost identical screen names, two have 
identical profile pictures and two have identical header images. The profile pictures and 
header images of all four accounts have a similar format.  Three of the four accounts link 
to a blogspot.jp blog. While there is a variation in the number of friends and followers 
between these accounts, each of them has a very similar number of friends and followers, 
suggesting that they have gained followers through reciprocal following. Each of these 
accounts has posted at least twice in the previous 20 minutes. 
Figure 1. The top four highest-posting accounts in the 1989 bot group 
 
The accounts in this group both post original content and retweet. All of the 
retweets were originally posted by ੤ӱॾ (@wurenhua), a leader in the 1989 movement 
who fled to America following the protests. Figure 2 shows two of these example posts. 
Both of the original posts by wurenhua have a picture from the 1989 pro-Democracy 
movement.  These bots retweet Wu RenhuaÕs posts adding common hashtags to increase 
their dissemination.  
Figure 2 Examples of forwarded posts from the 1989 bot group 
Translation: 
☆ Democracy, human rights @cnjs4 19 hours 
☆ On the afternoon of 13 May 1989 in Tiananmen Square, the students on hunger strike took an oathÉ 
https://twitter.com/wurenhua/status/596489776821211136 É #China #Hongkong #TFB #Hongkong 
Wu Renhua @wurenhua 
When the hunger strike began, Wang Dan led the hunger strike students to read the hunger strike oath. 
#Images of 4 June 1989 
Translation: 
Human rights ! democracy (2017) @wib_3 15 hours 
27 May 1989 ÒThe Concert for Democracy in ChinaÓ was held at the Hong Kong Racecourse, Hong Kong 
film stars and singers turned out in full forceÉ. #China #Hongkong #TFB #Hong Kong 
Wu Renhua @wurenhua 
27 May 1989 ÒThe Concert for Democracy in ChinaÓ was held at the Hong Kong Racecourse, Hong Kong 
film stars and singers turned out in full force. The activities were presided over for 12 hours by Huang 
Zhan, Chen Xinjian, Eric Tsang and Cen Jianxun. A total of 13 million Hong Kong dollars was raised for 
the democracy movement and the number of viewers was estimated to be almost one million #Images of 4 
June 1989 
These bots also frequently post links to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in Mandarin. All of these tweets were posted using the hashtags #China and #Ӫ
ᵳ (human rights); this means that, in particular, the hashtag #Ӫᵳ is dominated by these 
bots. Eleven accounts in this group posted more than 1,000 times each using the hashtag
Ӫᵳ during the data collection period, with the next highest poster posting 98 times. 
Almost 90% of the tweets that used the hashtag Ӫᵳ during the data collection period 
were posted by these 11 accounts. Figure 3 shows some example posts of this form and 
demonstrates how repetitive, formulaic and frequent these posts are. 
Figure 3. Examples of original posts from the 1989 bot group 
Translation: 
Democracy ☆ 27th Anniversary of 4th June @cjss4 23 hours 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public 
service in his country. #China #Human Rights [link to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
Mandarin] 
Democracy ☆ 27th Anniversary of 4th June @cjss4 23 hours 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21 1. Everyone has the right to take part in the 
government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. #China #Human Rights [link 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Mandarin] 
Democracy ۼ 27th Anniversary of 4th June @cjss4 23 hours 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 20 2. No one may be compelled to belong to an 
association. #China #Human Rights [link to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Mandarin] 
Given that the only previous reports of Chinese computational propaganda on 
Twitter have been of pro-state perspectives, the existence of this bot group is relatively 
surprising. This group is presumably aimed at the Chinese diaspora, students studying 
abroad, or those who jump the wall from the Chinese mainland to use Twitter. As a result 
information shared on Twitter with the hashtags commonly used by this bot group, such 
as #China and Ӫᵳ (human rights), appear to be dominated by this pro-democracy, 
anti-Chinese-state information. Indeed, this is not the only anti-state group posting in 
simplified Mandarin on Twitter. 
 
The pan-Asia group 
A second large group existed among the top 100 most frequently posting accounts in the 
dataset. This group disseminated information about the victims of the pan-Asia ÒPonzi 
scheme.Ó Approximately 220,000 people lost the money they has invested in the 
Kunming Pan-Asia Nonferrous Metals Exchange when it collapsed in late 2015 (China 
Economic Weekly, 2015; VOA Chinese, 2015). There have been protests by those who 
lost money in this collapse and accusations that the local government was complicit in 
supporting the exchange.  
This group appears to post less frequently than the 1989 group; the 22 accounts in 
this group that were among the top 100 posters in the dataset posted, on average, 43 
times per day in one of the monitored hashtags. This is lower than the cut-off point of 50 
tweets per day sometimes used to identify likely bot activity. The source of the tweets for 
accounts in this group are either Twitter for Android or Twitter for iPhone. Thus, 
although it is clear that this is a group of fake accounts, it is not clear that they are 
automated.  
Many of the accounts in this group utilize similar screen names, such as 
GG8bjf0629Ehtvr, DkAvNtlRmLDHJYI and 5KMGRvJX9mSYaoQ. Several of the 
accounts in this group present themselves as major Chinese news organizations or 
educational institutions in their display name, including 䴢ইᰕ๡ (Yunan Daily News), 
ѝ഻ᯠ㚎 (China News), ѝ഻g⪎哇 News (China gRili News), CCTV, ेӜ,圑? 
(Peking University), к⎧䍒㓿,圑? (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) 
and ਹ᷇,圑? (Jilin University)5. All of the accounts in this group listed their locations 
as being in the US.  
Several of these accounts used the same information in their profile 
descriptionsÑdespite being created at different times. For instance, the accounts named 
Jilin University (created in August 2016) and CCTV (created in February 2017) used an 
identical string of hashtags as their profile description: #China #Pan-Asia #Foreign 
Ministry #Travel #Nineteenth Party Congress #Xi Jinping #Pang Liyuan #Wang Qishan 
#Jiang Zemin #Meng Jianzhu #Beijing #Tiananmen Square #Peking University #Fudan 
University #Nanjing University #Wuhan University #Sun Yat-sen University #Xiamen 
University #Tsinghua University #Hong Kong university #United States #Trump 
#Harvard University #Cambridge University #University of Sydney. 
Figure 4 shows an example of the posts of this group, which appear to 
predominantly retweet content published by other accounts in the group. Accounts in this 
group tweet with a wide number of hashtags. This group showed up frequently in the 
dataset for their use of hashtags such as #ेӜ (Beijing) and #Ґ䘁ᒣ (Xi Jinping). 
However, as Figure 4 shows, they also post frequently in hashtags that were not 
monitored as part of this data collection. Thus, more research would be necessary to 
uncover the true size of this group. However, what is clear is that automated and fake 
accounts that aim to disseminate information that attacks or is counter to the information 
                                                
5	Surprisingly, despite publishing in simplified Mandarin (used in mainland China) many of the display 
names of accounts in this group utilised traditional characters: 㞼༡᪥ሗ instead ofப༡᪥ᣕ and୰ᅧ᪂
⪺ instead of ୰ᅜ᪂䰫 This suggests that this group might be linked with Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macau 
where traditional characters remain in use.	
disseminated by the Chinese state are prominent in Chinese language information on 
Twitter. Indeed, these two groups are not the only fake accounts promoting anti-Chinese-
state perspectives on Twitter. 
Figure 4. Example of retweeted content in the pan-Asia group 
 
Translation: 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics retweeted Stubborn Protest @juejiang01 3 May 
The #Pan-Asia victims were forced to Lishan by the Kunming, Yunan government. This cannot be helped 
until suffering every possible torment they would go to Beijing to request national aid in hope of 
recovering justice and their hard-earned money.#Wang Qishan #Yao Ming #Meng Jianzhu #Xi Jinping 
#Central Commission for Discipline Inspection #Hainan Airlines #Guo Wengui @PDChina 
Shangahi University of Finance and Economics retweeted Stubborn Protest @juejiang01 3 May 
Kunming government documents set up Fanya to participate in fraud 43 billion. Pan-Asian Exchange. 
#Apollo #Wang He #Joan #ChangÕan Street #Xinhua News Agency #Pan Asia 
Other anti-Chinese-state bot activity on Twitter 
This analysis also found evidence of other anti-Chinese-state bots (such as pro-Uighur 
and pro-Hong Kong independence bots) posting in simplified Chinese, Japanese and 
English. Restricting analysis to only hashtags associated with Tibet and Buddhism found 
no evidence of bots disseminating the pro-Chinese-state perspectives reported in the 
media in 2014. Instead, there was evidence of automation used to promote the messages 
of the Tibetan exile community and disseminate information about repression of ethnic 
Tibetans, predominantly in English. This analysis suggests that the Chinese state is not 
utilizing automation to influence discourse on Twitter. The implications of these findings 
for understanding Chinese international propaganda efforts are discussed in the 
conclusion section.  
Computational propaganda on Weibo: little evidence of automation  
In contrast to the high level of automaton in posts about China on Twitter, there was little 
evidence of automation in the Weibo dataset. Out of the 815,776 unique users in this 
dataset of 1,543,165 comments, only 145 users posted 100 or more comments across the 
examined posts. Based on an examination of their posting patterns, post content and post 
sources, these high-posting users did not appear to be using automation and there did not 
seem to be evidence that these were fake accounts.  
However, the content of the posts of the highest-posting users indicates that there 
may be significant trolling within these comments. The majority of comments from the 
highest-posting user were attacks on other posters, which spanned multiple posts in the 
dataset. While the majority of users who posted comments on these stories appear to be 
genuine individuals posting their opinions and thoughts, this evidence of high posting by 
troll accounts would potentially drive the conversation away from productive discussions. 
These findings are in line with previous research that found little evidence of 
automation in state-sponsored propaganda posts across a variety of platforms. Taken 
together with the findings from Twitter, these results suggest that, perhaps surprisingly 
given the sophistication of the automated censorship functionality of the domestic 
Chinese Internet and the apparently wide use of automation by political interests in the 
US and Europe, automation does not appear to be being used as part of the Chinese 
stateÕs propaganda strategy.  
Conclusion 
This article collected data to examine whether automation was present in hashtags 
associated with Chinese politics on Twitter and in comments on official news 
information on Weibo. These data indicate that the Chinese state is not using automation 
as part of either its domestic or international propaganda efforts. However, surprisingly, 
significant evidence of anti-Chinese state bot activity was found on Twitter, publishing 
predominantly in simplified Mandarin and presumably aimed at diasporic Chinese or 
those who Ôjump the wallÕ to access foreign social media platforms.  
While it may seem surprising to find that the Chinese state does not seem to be 
using automation, this can possibly be explained by several reasons. Firstly, Chinese 
international propaganda efforts have long been dominated by massive state-run 
companies such as CCTV, China Radio International and the China Daily. The focus on 
the Internet that intensified in 2016 has seen a rise in online media produced by 
traditional providers, such as the childrenÕs bedtime story explaining the One Belt, One 
Road policy posted to YouTube by the China Daily6 or the song about the 2016-2020 
Five Year Plan posted to YouTube by China Global Network Television.7 Incorporating 
bots and automation into this international propaganda strategy would require new 
technological capabilities that are not the province of these traditional media providers. 
Thus, it may be the case that despite its technological sophistication and massive 
                                                
6	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6Adz_arAYE	
7	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhLrHCKMqyM	
budgets, the Chinese state might be slow to incorporate bots into their propaganda 
strategy. 
Secondly, bots and automation are a cheap and dirty solution to achieving 
particular ends; they allow single individuals or small groups to harness computational 
power to spread their messages more effectively. However, China is a strong state that 
can call on a massive supply of human resources. Thus, manually created and 
disseminated propaganda may be a smarter and more effective strategy. On the domestic 
Chinese Internet, research based on a leak from a local propaganda office found that, 
instead of the army of individuals paid 50-cents per post, Chinese online propaganda was 
mostly executed by state-employees acting as part of their regular jobs (King et al., 
2017). 
Similarly, a recent report on computational propaganda in Taiwan found that the 
examined incidents showed no evidence of automation or even state coordination; 
instead it was regular Chinese Internet users (albeit nationalistic ones), who seemed to be 
taking it upon themselves to promote reunification with China in the Taiwanese Internet 
sphere (Monaco, 2017). This suggests that rather than relying on bots, which would be 
subject to computational detection and whose functionalities are limited, the Chinese 
state can utilise its human resources both directly (by tasking state employees with 
posting positive information online) and indirectly (by cultivating and facilitating 
Chinese citizens influenced by domestic propaganda to promote Chinese-state interests 
both domestically and internationally).  
This article uncovers the surprising fact that on Twitter (counter to media reports 
of Chinese state-associated bot activity) it is anti-state groups with few resources who are 
using automation to manipulate information about China and Chinese politics. One 
perspective on these results would be to conclude that Twitter and the use of automation 
on the platform is levelling the playing field for these less powerful voices to be heard. 
However, when Chinese speaking users come to Twitter they are normally doing so 
because they want to find more diverse, less-biased information. They tend to see the 
platform as more akin to a public sphere, in contrast to ChinaÕs more controlled online 
platforms. The fact that there is a great deal of automation, particularly within 
information in simplified Mandarin, suggests that Twitter is not acting as the kind of 
space for free information that these users hope to find.  
It may be the case that influencing Twitter discourse about China in simplified 
Mandarin is not a priority for the Chinese state. Although Twitter use by mainland 
Chinese citizens is not as rare as its banned status might suggest, those who go out of 
their way to access foreign social media platforms are relatively likely to already hold 
anti-Chinese state perspectives. Targeting these Chinese Twitter users with pro-state 
propaganda would perhaps have little effect. However, these users would likely be 
susceptible to anti-Chinese state propaganda, supporting the existence of the bots 
uncovered in this article.  
Twitter is also accessible to diasporic Chinese, including students studying 
abroad. However, information on the platform may have less effect on this population 
than might be hypothesized. Most Chinese students studying abroad continue to use 
domestic social media platforms such as Weibo, WeChat and QQ. It has also been 
reported that Chinese students who seen as holding anti-state views are denied visas or 
not selected for study abroad programs. Thus, the population of young Chinese who can 
access Twitter during their time abroad are already pre-selected as to be less susceptible 
to anti-Chinese state perspectives.  
Another possible reason for the lack of Chinese state automaton on Twitter might 
be that these bots, in fact, have little effect. While this article and other similar studies, 
utilize hashtags to investigate the influence of bots on social media, prominence in 
hashtags does not necessarily translate into influence of discourse or opinions. 
Information exposure on Twitter is primarily limited to information posted by accounts 
the user follows (and advertisements). As such, bot influence might be mostly limited to 
search results and trending topics. More research is necessary to investigate the influence 
of bots and bot-created content on public opinion.  
Additionally, mostly in response to increased media and academic focus on 
online automation, social media platforms have committed to controlling bots. Thus, it is 
potentially the case that posts from bot accounts known to the platform would be 
prevented from appearing on user timelines and in search results. Previous research by 
the author on Weibo demonstrated that accounts and posts the user follows but that 
appear to be posting spam are hidden from user timelines (Bolsover, 2017). It would be 
reasonable to believe that Twitter also engages in a similar practice. Thus, more research 
is needed to uncover the true influence of bots on online discourse. 
This research is also limited in several ways in several other ways. Firstly, the 
datasets are based on delineated time periods. It may be the case that automation is 
utilized surrounding particular events and the fast-moving nature of both the Internet and 
Chinese politics means that a lack of automation now does not necessarily mean a lack of 
automation in six months. Secondly, the conclusions of this article are based on posts in 
hashtags about Chinese politics on Twitter and comments on posts by official 
information providers on Weibo. Chinese state automation could possibly be found on 
these platform in other areas. On Twitter, Chinese state-associated automation could be 
being used to attack critics or foreign news organizations publishing in Chinese or to 
increase the dissemination of Chinese state-produced information. If these posts were not 
made during the timeframe examined using one of the hashtags examined, they would 
not be present in this dataset.  
Thirdly, a conceptual limitation of this research is its focus on the use of bots and 
automation to achieve certain ends. As the case of Chinese domestic propaganda shows, 
manual production and dissemination of online propaganda may be more effective than 
automated efforts. Given the extent of automation found in recent political events in the 
US and UK, continued research into bots on social media is important; however, the 
focus on automation should not blind researchers to the larger picture of online 
propaganda that includes cyborgs, hybrid accounts and manually produced propaganda.  
Despite these limitations, this article provides the first academic insight into the 
use of automation to influence information about China and Chinese politics on 
international social media platforms. It also contributes to the limited knowledge about 
the use of bots on Chinese domestic social media. Perhaps surprisingly, given media 
reports of Chinese state-associated bots on Twitter, no evidence of Chinese state 
automation was found either domestically or internationally. This contributes to the 
literature on Chinese soft power and foreign diplomacy; despite indications that more 
attention would be paid to ChinaÕs image on foreign social media, automation does not 
(yet) seem to be part of the countryÕs international propaganda strategy.  
Even more surprising was the finding of large amounts of anti-Chinese state 
automation in hashtags about China and Chinese politics on Twitter. While the true 
influence of bots on the beliefs and actions of social media site users is still unknown, 
almost 30% of the content in the examined hashtags was posted by bots. Very little is 
known about information on Twitter in the Chinese language or the way in which the 
platform might be being used to manipulate public opinion among Mandarin speakers.  
The topic of automation, algorithms and online politics has only recently become 
a major area of investigation. This article is the first to address the question of the 
existence of computational propaganda about China on international social media and, 
thus, should not be the final answer to questions about this phenomenon. As research in 
this field progresses, it is important to remember that bots are not agentic nor are they 
isolated. They are created by individuals to fulfill specific functions. The concern about 
bots and automation should not distract from the fact that these techniques are just a tool 
that is embedded in an underlying social structure. More focus should be paid to the 
political, social and economic systems that facilitate this kind of opinion manipulation 
and the conditions that mean their use is prevalent. More nuanced methods are also 
needed to detect online computational propaganda. Further efforts should move away 
from a solely computational and detection-based focus, to qualitative considerations of 
the content of automation-supported information to evaluate whether it is propaganda 
rather than whether it is simply computational. It is the first we are worried about not the 
second and this study has shown that the second is not always a proxy for the first.  
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